

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 258051

FOLLOWING REPEAT MBFR VIENNA 00433 ACTION SENT TO WASHDC
SECSTATE DATED 11/21/74:

QUOTE S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0433

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: GETTING ALLIED AGREEMENT TO INCLUSION OF
AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0424

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: WE HAVE REVIEWED DRAFT PAPER
OF 19 NOV
V ON ROLE
OF AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR WHICH WASHINGTON AGENCIES ARE PREPARING FOR
PRESENTATION IN NATO.

2. IN ESSENCE, THE APPROACH RECOMMENDED IN THAT PAPER
FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD
PROPOSE TO THE EAST THAT:

(A) THE COMMON CEILING BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE
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AIR MANPOWER, THOUGH WITHOUT IMPLYING THAT
THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO REDUCE AIR
MANPOWER IN PHASE II, AND,

(B) THAT THE US AND USSR COULD REDUCE UP TO 15 PCT OF
THEIR AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I.

3. AS WE SEE IT, THE ISSUE OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY THE ALLIES CANNOT BE AVOIDED, EITHER WITH THE ALLIES OR WITH THE EAST. FOR THIS REASON, WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON MODIFY THE CURRENT DRAFT APPROACH TO THE ALLIES TO MEET THIS ISSUE DIRECTLY NOW BY PUTTING FORWARD TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE ALLIES: IN ALTERNATIVE "A" THE ALLIES WOULD COLLECTIVELY OFFER TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS LEADING TO A COMMON CEILING COVERING BOTH AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER AND THEY WOULD PROPOSE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION, A SUPPLEMENTAL INCREMENT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER BE ADDED TO THE ALREADY PROPOSED US-SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS; IN ALTERNATIVE "B" -- WHICH WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY THE PRESENT WASHINGTON APPROACH WITHOUT THE FEATURE OF THE COMBINED AIR-GROUND COMMON CEILING -- THE WEST WOULD SUGGEST TO THE EAST THE ADDITION OF A SUPPLEMENTAL INCREMENT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN US-SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT PROPOSING ALLIED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. END SUMMARY.

4. WE QUESTION THE PRACTICABILITY OF THE CURRENT WASHINGTON APPROACH ON THREE GROUNDS:

(A) WE DON'T THINK THERE IS TIME ENOUGH TO GAIN ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THIS APPROACH FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND. DECEMBER 10 IS THE LAST SCHEDULED INFORMAL SESSION AND THE LAST DATE ON WHICH IT COULD BE PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST. IN ADDITION TO DEMONSTRATED ALLIED RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, THE SPC AND COUNCIL WILL BE GIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION IN COMING WEEKS TO PREPARATIONS FOR NATO MINISTERIAL.

(B) WE THINK THAT THE ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE FRG, WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO ADOPT THIS APPROACH. THEY WILL CONSIDER THAT AN OFFER TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER SECRET

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UNDER THE COMMON CEILING OF ITSELF IMPLIES A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTION OF AIR MANPOWER. AND THEY WILL CONSIDER THAT GOING FURTHER TO INCLUDE US AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS ESTABLISHES A STRONG PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS, REGARDLESS OF US ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY.

(C) WE THINK THAT, EVEN IF THE ALLIES AGREED TO THIS APPROACH, IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE NEGOTIATING IMPACT AND WOULD NOT SERVE TO MAKE THE CONCEPT OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER MORE ACCEPTABLE IN SOVIET EYES.

5. OUR REASONS FOR THINKING THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD LACK NEGOTIATING IMPACT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) BOTH THE US AND SOVIET REDUCTION IN

PHASE I WOULD BE INCREASED. BUT SINCE THE SOVIET AIR MANPOWER TOTAL IN THE AREA IS ROUGHLY TWICE THE US TOTAL, SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD BE INCREASED BY TWICE AS MANY MEN AS THE US PHASE I REDUCTION.

(B) EASTERN REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II NEEDED TO REACH AN OVERALL GROUND/AIR MANPOWER CEILING AOULD BE INCREASED AT LEAST 12,000 (THE EXCESS OF TOTAL EASTERN AIR MANPOWER OVER WESTERN AIR MANPOWER), WHILE WESTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SLIGHTLY DECREASED (BY 4,000). MOREOVER, THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WHOM WE HAVE OFFERED TO EXCLUDE FROM THE GROUND FORCE REDUCTION BASE WOULD HAVE TO BE COUNTED IN ANY EVENT. IN SHORT, INSTEAD OF MAKING PARITY IN GROUND FORCES MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS, WHICH IS THE MAIN PURPOSE OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS, THIS APPROACH WOULD INCREASE ITS COST TO THEM.

(C) IF THE WEST OFFERED TO REDUCE US AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I ONLY, THE EAST WOULD INEVITABLY ASK WHETHER THE OTHER ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO REDUCE THEIR AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE II. THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE NO ANSWER FOR THIS, OR WOULD HAVE TO GIVE A NEGATIVE ANSWER.

6. THUS, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD SEE LITTLE LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS THE EAST FROM THE PRESENT WASHINGTON APPROACH COMBINING US PHASE I AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WITH A COMMON CEILING
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ON ALL MANPOWER IN THE AREA, THE WEST MIGHT GET SOME LEVERAGE FROM A PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS WITHOUT THE COMMON CEILING FEATURE. BUT THIS WOULD BE LIMITED. SUCH AN OFFER WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE SOVIETS ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A MODEST DECREASE IN US AIR MANPOWER AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY SAW US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I AS PREJUDICING THE QUESTION OF ALLIED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AND WERE WILLING TO PAY FOR THESE LIMITED BENEFITS ON A 2-TO-1 BASIS.

7. WE WILL NOT KNOW HOW STRONG SOVIET INTEREST IN REDUCTION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS UNTIL AFTER THE ALLIES HAVE PUT FORWARD THE NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL. BUT, IF THE SOVIETS STILL PRESS FOR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AFTER THIS HAS BEEN DONE, THE LEVERAGE FOR THE WEST ARISING FROM THIS INTEREST WILL BE MAXIMIZED ONLY IF ALL NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE WILLING TO INCLUDE THEIR AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS.

8. IN ORDER TO APPLY THIS LEVERAGE TOWARDS EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, NATO WOULD HAVE TO EXPRESS ITS WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER

IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATING A PHASE I AGREEMENT.
A DECISION DURING PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE THEIR
AIR MANPOWER BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD
COME TOO LATE TO BE USEFUL IN ACHIEVING EASTERN AGREEMENT
TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

9. GIVEN THESE FACTORS -- THE SHORTNESS OF TIME
REMAINING TO SECURE ALLIED AGREEMENT IN THIS ROUND: THE
PROBABLY ALLIED UNWILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY
OF US PHASE I AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN ISOLATION FROM THEIR
PRECEDENT-SETTING EFFECT FOR ALLIED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
IN PHASE II: AND THE ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NEGOTIATING
SITUATION-- WE THINK IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO FOREGO THE
EFFORT TO GAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THE PRESENT WASHINGTON
APPROACH PRIOR TO THE DECEMBER RECESS AND TO MODIFY THE
US APPROACH.

10. AS WE SEE IT, THE ISSUE OF ALLIED AIR MANPOWER
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REDUCTIONS CANNOT BE AVOIDED WITH THE EAST, AND SHOULD NOT
BE AVOIDED WITH THE ALLIES. WE THINK IT PREFERABLE TO MEET
THIS ISSUE DIRECTLY WITH THE ALLIES NOW. IF WE DELAY,
WE WILL LOSE VALUABLE TIME. IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE
ALLIES, IN PARTICULAR THE FRG, WILL AGREE TO AIR MANPOWER
REDUCTIONS, IF AT ALL, ONLY AFTER LONG STUDY. IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT WE GET THIS STUDY PROCESS STARTED AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

11. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND, THAT THE US PUT FORWARD TWO OPTIONS FOR
CON-
SIDERATION BY THE ALLIES:

(A) ALTERNATIVE "A" DESCRIBED IN MBFR VIENNA 0278 WOULD DE
FOR THE ALLIES COLLECTIVELY TO OFFER TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER
IN REDUCTIONS LEADING TO A COMMON CEILING COVERING BOTH
AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER. THE ALLIES WOULD ALSO PROPOSE
TO THE EAST THAT, AS A FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION,
A SUPPLEMENTAL INCREMENT OF AIR FORCE MAN-
POWER BE ADDED TO THE ALREADY PROPOSED US-SOVIET PHASE I
REDUCTIONS. DELEGATION STRONGLY PREFERS THIS OPTION.

(B) ALTERNATIVE "B" WOULD BE FOR THE WEST TO
SUGGEST TO THE EAST THE ADDITION OF A SUPPLEMENTAL
INCREMENT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN US-SOVIET PHASE I
REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT PROPOSING ALLIED AIR MANPOWER
REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, BUT WITH CONTINUATION INTO PHASE II
OF THE ALREADY PROPOSED AIR MANPOWER FREEZE FOR THE ALLIES.
THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE PRESENT WASHINGTON
PROPOSAL BUT WOULD OMIT THE FEATURE OF A COMBINED AIR
AND GROUND COMMON CEILING. AS STATED EARLIER, WE BELIEVE
THIS OPTION WOULD HAVE ONLY LIMITED NEGOTIATING IMPACT.

12. WE AGREE WITH THE USE OF 900,000 AS THE ILLUSTRATIVE

AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING AS CONTAINED IN THE WASHINGTON APPROACH AND SUGGEST THAT THIS FIGURE BE ADVANCED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ALTERNATIVE A IN ORDER TO ENABLE ALLIES TO COMPUTE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THIS ALTERNATIVE FOR NATO. BEGIN FYI: WE BELIEVE US SHOULD ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, THAT IT MAY ULTIMATELY BE NECESSARY TO DROP THE AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING TO 880,000 TO MAKE ROOM FOR TOTAL US REDUCTIONS IN BOTH PHASES TO REACH 50,000, A NUMBER WHICH WOULD MORE SECRET

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NEARLY APPROXIMATE CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF A REASONABLE MBFR OUTCOME. END FYI.

13. IN PRESENTING THESE OPTIONS, THE US COULD INDICATE THAT IT STRONGLY PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE "A", BUT COULD ACCEPT ALTERNATIVE "B" IF THE ALLIES COULD NOT AGREE TO ALTERNATIVE "A". THE US COULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE ALLIES THAT THE PURPOSE OF PUTTING FORWARD ALTERNATIVE "A" TO THE EAST WOULD BE TO MAKE THE CONCEPT OF A PARITY IN GROUND FORCES MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST. WE SHOULD TELL THE ALLIES THAT, IF AFTER, REVIEWING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER, THE ALLIES DECIDED AGAINST THIS, (23 297)\$?3 0430-43\$ 59 -:305 5#8 \$3:8 89,. BUT THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO REALIZE THAT SUCH A DECISION, ON THEIR PART WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ALLIED CAPACITY TO ACHIEVE A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCES.

14. IN ADDITION, THE US COULD SUGGEST THAT THE ALLIES AGREE INTERNALLY AMONG THEMSELVES THAT (A) THE FOCUS OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ON GROUND FORCES; (B) ALLIED GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN BOTH PHASES SHOULD NOT EXCEED TEN PERCENT OF TOTAL NATO AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS'S AND (C) THAT THE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTION SHOULD NOT EXCEED TWENTY PERCENT OF TOTAL REDUCTIONS, THUS MAINTAINING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF AIR TO GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. WE THINK THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE GENERAL PRINCIPLES COULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE ALLIES TO AGREE ON SUBSEQUENT SPECIFIC AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

15. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A MODIFICATION OF THE US APPROACH TO THE ALLIES ALONG THESE LINES WOULD SOMEWHAT DELAY PRESENTATION IN BRUSSELS. NEVERTHELESS, WE FEEL THAT THE MODIFICATIONS WE RECOMMEND WOULD ULTIMATELY EXPEDITE RATHER THAN DELAY ALLIED AGREEMENT -- EVEN IF THE ALLIES WERE FINALLY WILLING TO AGREE TO NO MORE THAN A PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE OUR MANPOWER IN US PHASE I REDUCTIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WE SUGGEST WOULD BE

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ACCEPTED BY THE ALLIES AND WOULD RESULT IN A MORE
EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING APPROACH TO THE EAST AT THE OUTSET
OF THE NEXT NEGOTIATING ROUND IN JANUARY.
RESOR UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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